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Key Points 
This policy contribution describes the unresolved adjustment problems confronting the eurozone, 
and places them in historical perspective by comparing developments in key real economic 
variables under EMU with those observed under the Bretton Woods system. The main finding is 
that the eurozone is afflicted by a strong deflationary bias and that, therefore, under current trends, 
deep economic and social strains will continue to project a dark cloud over its future survival. 
Under Bretton Woods, the United States opened its domestic market to pull in net exports of its 
main partners, invested to improve its productivity and provided ample liquidity to grease the 
expansion of trade and the payment system. Throughout the period, US domestic demand was 
growing buoyantly; after the mid-1960s, the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the dollar 
was amplifying the room for expansion in the rest of the industrialised world. Thus, altogether, it 
comes as no surprise that the Bretton Woods system displays the best real economic performance 
amongst all exchange rate systems on record. 
The eurozone, on the other hand, has been anchored to a country with stagnating or slowly 
growing domestic demand, a sharply depreciated real exchange rate and little contribution of stable 
long-term capital flows to the financing of the current account deficits in the rest of the area. Total 
factor productivity growth has been stagnant throughout the area and there has been little market 
opening beyond manufacturing, the source of the German competitive advantage. The services 
markets have remained closed, especially for the very important network utility services (energy, 
transport and communications), which are still organised on a national basis under tight national 
protection (and often public ownership of service providers). This market segmentation has been a 
main factor in explaining the sizeable delays in the adoption of IT technologies and the productivity 
shortfalls in the eurozone and the European Union relative to the United States. 
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1. Incomplete monetary union under 
stress 
History shows that – lacking an automatic 
balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism as 
under the gold standard – fixed exchange rate 
arrangements tend to break down under the 
attacks of financial speculation, but also that 
these attacks are encouraged by sustained 
divergences in prices, wages and productivity. 
Countries with higher inflation and lower 
productivity growth typically display persistent 
public-sector deficits and rising debt-to-GDP 
ratios, which on occasion have become the trigger 
of confidence crises and speculative attacks in 
financial markets.1 
As a monetary union based on a single currency, 
the eurozone was supposed to be immune from 
these problems, as exchange-rate risks would 
vanish and payment disequilibria within the area 
would be smoothly offset by private capital flows 
(James, 2012). These expectations proved 
delusional: the sovereign debt crisis in the 
eurozone in 2010-12 started as a fully-fledged 
balance-of-payments crisis (Baldwin et al. 2015), 
prompted by the accumulation of large payment 
imbalances between its members and reflecting 
persistent underlying divergences in prices and 
costs. 
This happened because monetary union did not 
eliminate market segmentation and nominal 
rigidities, while fiscal policies stayed national 
and continued to respond to national goals, with 
inadequate attention to the convergence 
requirements of monetary union. The problem 
was brought back to the surface by the Greek 
debt crisis, early in 2010, which later turned into 
a sovereign debt crisis of the entire periphery. 
This latter crisis undermined mutual confidence 
amongst the member states concerning the 
respect of budgetary rules and reintroduced, in 
                                                   
1 See Eichengreen (1996) for a history of the International 
Monetary System and Bordo (1993) for a historical overview 
of the Bretton Woods exchange-rate arrangements. Under 
the gold standard – the longest-lasting arrangement in 
modern history – the balance-of-payments adjustment 
mechanism came close to resembling David Hume’s price-
specie flow mechanism, entailing an automatic correction of 
disequilibria through changes in gold reserves and relative 
the eyes of private investors, a currency-
redenomination risk. Hence, the eurozone has de 
facto reverted to a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement between different ‘national euros’, 
each one characterised by its own risk premium 
or discount; the traditional problems of fixed 
exchange-rate systems – adjustment, liquidity 
and confidence – have come back to haunt us. 
The confidence and liquidity problems are at 
present muted by the ECB bond-buying 
programme, but they are likely to re-emerge 
when the programme ends, if underlying 
imbalances in competitive positions and 
excessive public debt levels are not redressed. 
This note describes the unresolved adjustment 
problems confronting the eurozone and places 
them in historical perspective by comparing 
developments in key real economic variables 
under EMU with those observed under the 
Bretton Woods system (henceforth BW). This 
comparison must of course be placed in proper 
context: while BW covered much of the world 
economy, the eurozone represents less than one-
fifth of world GDP and about one-quarter of 
world trade. And yet the comparison is useful to 
highlight the different effects of the two systems 
on participating countries.  
The main finding is that the eurozone is afflicted 
by a strong deflationary bias and that, therefore, 
under current trends, deep economic and social 
strains will continue to project a dark cloud over 
its future survival.  
2. Persistent imbalances 
When the eurozone started, Germany was still 
the “sick man of Europe”, mainly reflecting the 
dramatic cost of reunification. The response was 
a prolonged period of wage moderation by 
unionised workers (Bofinger, 2015), in 
combination with reforms that increased labour 
market flexibility and created special low-cost 
prices in response to trade imbalances (or, in the more 
sophisticated version with central banks and capital flows, 
described by the Cunliffe Committee after World War I, via 
changes in money supply prompted by the conversion into 
national currencies of gold flows resulting from net trade 
balances; see Eichengreen (1996, pp. 25-26).  
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contracts (the ‘mini-jobs’) that today employ over 
7 million people (Dustmann et al., 2014). The 
result was startling: from 1999 to 2008, unit 
labour costs (ULC) declined by 9% in 
manufacturing and stayed constant for the total 
economy, leading to a rapid re-absorption of 
unemployment and a stellar export performance. 
Meanwhile, Germany’s partners in the eurozone 
were generally experiencing UCL increases 
above the ECB inflation target of 2%, especially in 
the periphery, not least because of abundant 
credit flowing in from Germany and other ‘core’ 
countries following the vanishing of risk premia 
on peripheral borrowing. 
Figure 1. Unit labour costs, labour productivity and labour cost (annual growth rates, %) 
 
Note: Our updating of Graphs 5.16 and 5.17 from European Commission (2014) p. 90. 
Source: Eurostat for productivity and ULC; Ameco for compensation per employee. 
 
The overall impact on unit labour costs vis-à-vis 
the main eurozone partners may be gauged from 
Figure 1: in the years preceding the financial 
crisis, all eurozone partners lost out heavily in 
their wage (and price) competitiveness relative to 
Germany. These losses were reversed in the 
ensuing years by the countries undertaking 
tough adjustment programmes to regain market 
access – i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – 
but not by the other partners, including France 
and Italy as well as other core countries.2 This has 
happened in spite of the acceleration of the wage 
dynamics in Germany, where a (rather high) 
minimum wage has been introduced by law and 
                                                   
2 The figure includes the data for Poland: it shows the strong 
advantage enjoyed by a non-euro country that could enjoy 
the benefits of low wages and rapid productivity increases, 
thanks to its flexible labour market and fresh access to the 
EU internal market, without suffering the constraints of a 
wage contracts have become more generous, as 
labour market conditions have tightened. 
The upper quadrant of Figure 2 depicts the 
resulting evolution of real effective exchange 
rates (REERs) of eurozone partners: as may be 
seen, the peripheral countries display a large real 
appreciation, only partially corrected since the 
crisis, while the core countries (excluding 
Germany) display a moderate real depreciation. 
Germany stands out as the lower-bound outlier, 
with substantial real depreciation against all 
other eurozone members in the pre-crisis period 
barely reduced in the post-crisis years. 3 
fixed exchange rate in the face of the depreciating real 
exchange rate of Germany.   
3 The figure includes the data for Poland: it shows the strong 
advantage enjoyed by a non-euro country that benefits from 
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In the middle quadrant of Figure 2, one finds the 
current account imbalances of eurozone 
members: the large deficit in the periphery 
closely mirror the ample surpluses in the core. It 
should be recalled that the inception of the euro 
opened the way to an almost fivefold increase in 
Germany’s trade balance with eurozone partners 
between 1999 and 2007, which was the dominant 
component of its GDP acceleration in those years 
(and the slowdown in manufacturing in much of 
the periphery); and that the resulting surplus was 
only partially reversed (for about half of the total 
increase) in 2008-14. 
After the crisis, deficits shrank abruptly with 
falling domestic demand, as peripheral countries 
entered deep recessions; the surpluses were 
largely reabsorbed in core countries with the 
notable exception of Germany and the 
Netherlands. In 2013-15, Germany’s surplus has 
remained on average above 7 per cent of GDP, 
with its main counterpart shifting to emerging 
countries and, to a lesser extent, to the United 
States. This development seems underpinned by 
a trend increase in aggregate saving, notably by 
the corporate sector, and a trend decrease in 
investment, relative to GDP; in the meantime the 
public sector deficit was all but eliminated, 
adding to aggregate domestic savings.4 
The lower quadrant of Figure 2 calls our attention 
to another important feature of the post-crisis 
eurozone system: after the crisis re-established 
the diversity of national currencies and the 
balance of payment constraint, domestic demand 
                                                   
low wages and rapid productivity increases, thanks to its 
flexible labour market and fresh access to the EU internal 
market, without suffering the constraints of a fixed exchange 
rate in the face of the depreciating real exchange rate of 
Germany.   
4 Various estimates seem to confirm that these developments 
are out of line with past analysis of the ‘fundamental’ 
determinants of the German current account balance, and 
therefore a substantial part of the surplus remains 
unexplained (European Commission, 2014). For one thing, 
the unprecedented and protracted slowdown in wages – 
required to save jobs from the impact of globalisation – 
flattened domestic demand through the first half of the past 
decade (lower quadrant of Figure 2); in the ensuing ten years 
and output growth in the rest of the eurozone fell 
below those observed in Germany (as reflected in 
the relative slopes of the curves in the figure). In 
the figure I have also reported the correlations 
between the current account balances in the core 
and the periphery – calculated over yearly levels 
and absolute changes: as may be seen, the values 
have turned from large and negative to large and 
positive, possibly confirming that core (German) 
surpluses are now “attracting” the current 
account balances of the periphery.5 As intra-
eurozone trade typically represents some 50% of 
total trade of its members, the existence of trade 
with third countries may weaken, but not 
eliminate these interactions within the eurozone.  
One wonders to what extent this may have 
become a structural feature of the eurozone: for 
countries that cannot correct their real 
appreciation relative to Germany, domestic 
demand and output growth cannot exceed that 
observed in Germany without pushing the 
country against the balance-of-payments 
constraint and eliciting prompt punishment by 
financial markets. The ECB provision of liquidity 
may offer temporary respite – as it has indeed 
done during the crisis (Micossi, 2015a) – but it 
cannot remove the constraint. On this, the 
European Commission (2015a) notes that “the 
current account improvements recorded in 
previous years were to a large extent non-
cyclical, since imports were reduced on a 
permanent basis as a result of reduced potential 
output in the non-tradable sector”.  
(to 2015), domestic demand increased by less than 1% per 
year, opening an unprecedented gap with GDP growth – 
filled by net exports – which may well explain the reluctance 
of investors to invest.  
5 The reversal of these correlation signs was pointed out to 
me by Daniel Gros. On this, the European Commission 
(2015) confirms that “external rebalancing is ongoing, but 
progress has not yet translated into significant reduction in 
the stock of external debt, while large current account 
surpluses have not adjusted ... implying a progressive 
growth in the stock of their external assets” (p. 15). This 
remains as an important factor of financial fragility.  
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Figure 2. Real effective exchange rate, current account and domestic demand 
 
Note: REERs deflated by unit labour costs in the total economy and computed with respect to EZ 18 trading 
partners. CORE countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Finland and the Netherlands. 
Data source: Eurostat. 
 
Source: IMF. 
 
Source: Ameco. 
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In sum, Germany has emerged as a kind of real 
economic anchor of the eurozone, forcing its 
preference for high savings and slow growth of 
domestic demand onto the other members, 
where however this slow growth is incompatible 
with the need to reduce debt and reabsorb much 
higher unemployment and social distress. At the 
same time, very low inflation further compresses 
the margin for change in relative prices and 
wages. 
Figure 3 casts further light on the depth and 
persistence of the divergence in fundamentals 
within the eurozone. The total factor productivity 
(TFP) developments are represented in the upper 
quadrant: as may be seen, while all eurozone 
member countries fall behind the United States, 
the inception of the euro has coincided with an 
adverse structural break in productivity in the 
periphery, with no visible sign of recovery as yet. 
Elsewhere (Micossi, 2015b), I have argued that 
lax financial conditions and the shifting 
composition of output towards non-tradables in 
the periphery, linked to real exchange-rate 
appreciation, may help explain these 
developments. An indirect confirmation may be 
found in the data on the quality of institutions 
                                                   
6 Debt ratios stand above 120% in three countries (Greece, 
Italy and Portugal), at 197% in Greece (where each bout of 
austerity has only raised the level higher, despite private 
creditors’ write-offs of €100 billion), above 100% in Belgium 
and Ireland, and close to 100% in France and in Spain, where 
they are still rising. That Greece cannot honour these debts 
and that some kind of debt relief will again be required is 
obvious; and yet the current adjustment programme agreed 
(based on World Bank indicators), depicted in the 
middle quadrant of Figure 2: they show, after the 
start of the euro, a deterioration of key 
institutions that are relevant for economic 
performance everywhere, but even more 
strongly in the periphery. While a drop in 
government effectiveness may be due to some 
extent to the dramatic cuts in public expenditure 
required by austerity, there is no reason why the 
preservation of the rule of law, the control of 
corruption or the quality of regulation should 
have worsened in response to the financial crisis. 
A large weight in these results for the periphery 
is attributable to Italy. 
The third quadrant of Figure 3 displays debt-to-
GDP ratios for Germany, the core and the 
periphery of the eurozone. Public-debt ratios 
diminish in Germany and Ireland, but are still 
increasing in many countries.6 For highly 
indebted countries, the apparent weak effect on 
inflation of the ECB’s quantitative easing (QE) 
and the inability to agree on common policies 
capable of raising real economic growth above 
the current meagre numbers portends renewed 
financial turbulence, with smaller cushions to 
cope with it. 
with EU institutions entails a fresh cut of the public sector 
deficit of some 4.5 percentage points of GDP, in a country 
that has already lost a quarter of its output since the financial 
crisis struck. This was the price to be paid to gain approval 
of the new rescue package in the German Bundestag, but has 
hardly improved the credibility and sustainability of 
eurozone policies.  
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Figure 3. TFP, quality of institutions and public debt 
 
Source: Conference Board.  
 
Note: Core are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. 
Source: World Bank. Our updating and reclassification of the figure from Boltho & Carlin (2012).  
 
Source: IMF. 
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3. Comparing the eurozone with 
Bretton Woods exchange-rate 
arrangements 
The BW fixed exchange-rate system differs from 
the eurozone in many important features, 
including the fact that the former offered a way 
out of parity changes when confidence problems 
made financial stresses unendurable, while that 
option does not formally exist in the latter 
(although the prospect of Grexit has been 
repeatedly invoked in the European Council in 
the heat of life-and-death negotiations over the 
Greek adjustment programme, and markets have 
no doubt taken notice). Moreover, in the former 
system, liquidity creation was in the hands of the 
central bank providing the reserve currency, the 
US dollar, while in the latter it is in the hands of 
an independent institution governed by a 
Committee (the ESCB Governing Council) 
deciding by and large by consensus. Thus, the 
former system was open to excessive liquidity 
creation, which destroyed confidence and 
eventually broke the system (Triffin, 1978; 
Meltzer, 1991), whereas in the latter, confidence 
was shattered to the breaking point by the 
possibility that the ECB would not be allowed to 
intervene as a lender of last resort in distressed 
sovereign debt markets (De Grauwe, 2013; 
Micossi, 2015b).7  
A feature common to the two systems is that the 
adjustment burden falls more on the deficit 
country when liquidity is scarce, and on the 
surplus country when liquidity is abundant 
(Meltzer, 1991; Bordo, 1993). In any event, neither 
                                                   
7 In the eurozone, the first-line escape valve when one of its 
members comes under attack by financial markets is the 
existence of a payment clearing system, the Target system, 
that provides open-ended financing of payment imbalances, 
as long as national banks have eligible collateral to bring to 
the ECB. During the sovereign debt crisis, private capital 
flows vanished and the interbank payment system came 
close to collapsing. The ECB then acted to provide ample 
financing facilities to distressed banks, leading to the 
emergence of ample Target debtor and creditor balances 
(Bordo, 2014; Sinn & Wollmershäuser, 2011).    
system has been able to establish a functioning 
adjustment mechanism to correct competitive 
imbalances based on an agreed burden-sharing 
between surplus and deficit countries (Bordo, 
2014).  
But there are other features of the two systems 
worth comparing, notably including the balance 
of economic benefits from participation in the 
system. In this regard, a first feature to be 
stressed concerns the structure and evolution 
over time of the balance of payments. In both 
systems the centre country displays on average a 
current balance-of-payments surplus; however, 
under BW the surplus was shrinking over time, 
thus generating a positive demand stimulus for 
the other participants (Bordo, 1993); in the 
eurozone, the opposite has been true, as has been 
described. Moreover, under BW the current 
payment surplus was offset by massive official 
aid flows in the 1950s (the pre-convertibility 
phase, up to 1958), and equally massive private 
direct investment flows in the 1960s (the 
convertibility phase).8 These flows played a 
paramount role in fostering the post-war 
reconstruction and then rapid catching up in 
technology and productivity.  
This contrasts sharply with the experience of the 
eurozone, where direct investment by Germany 
in the rest of the area, and especially the 
periphery, has been subdued up to the crisis, 
close to nil after the crisis struck and capital 
markets became fragmented by vanishing 
confidence in the periphery. Thus, the 
8 Under BW, full convertibility of national currencies into US 
dollars and gold for current balance-of-payments 
transactions was established at the end of 1958; countries 
maintained the right to impose restriction on capital flows, 
which were indeed repeatedly resorted to when pressure on 
existing parities built up strongly. Thus, the convertibility 
phase of BW lasted from the end of 1958 to the severance of 
the link between the US dollar and gold in August 1971, and 
the fixed parity system eventually broke down in early 1973 
(Eichengreen, 1996; Meltzer, 1991).   
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counterparty to ballooning current surpluses was 
portfolio investment out of the area.9 
Three indicators of the real economic impact of 
the two exchange-rate systems are presented in 
Figure 4 (over the respective time horizons of 
existence):  
1. In the upper quadrant, it may be seen that 
the real exchange rate of the centre 
country was always relatively more 
undervalued in the eurozone than under 
BW, entailing a persistently stronger 
competitive pressure on other 
participants in the system.  
2. In the middle quadrant, one can see that 
the United States always maintained 
under BW a negative real net trade 
balance (here depicted as a ratio to 
domestic demand, to highlight its 
aggregate impact), while in Germany 
there has been a swelling surplus 
depressing demand in the rest of the area.  
3. In the lower quadrant, one can see the 
relative evolution of labour productivity 
in the two areas, with the United States 
losing ground in favour of its partners 
throughout the existence of those 
arrangements, and Germany (slowly) 
gaining ground throughout.10  
In sum, under BW the United States opened their 
domestic market to pull in net exports of their 
main partners, invested to improve their 
productivity and provided ample liquidity to 
facilitate the expansion of trade and the payment 
                                                   
9 According to the European Commission (and other 
observers), these investments abroad have yielded dismal 
returns, also due to massive losses on derivative positions 
(see European Commission, 2014, Box 4.1, p. 72). Busse & 
Gros (2016) have challenged this view – mainly based on the 
observed discrepancy between the cumulated current 
accounts of Germany and its net international investment 
position (NIIP). They argue that the NIIP is incorrectly 
measured, while the returns on net foreign investments in 
the balance of payments have risen in recent years (to some 
system. Throughout the BW period, US domestic 
demand was growing buoyantly; after the mid-
1960s, the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
of the dollar was amplifying the room for 
expansion in the rest of the industrialised world. 
Thus, altogether it comes as no surprise that the 
BW system displays the best real economic 
performance amongst all exchange rate systems 
on record (Bordo, 1993). 
The eurozone, on the other hand, has been 
anchored to a country with stagnating or very 
slowly growing domestic demand, a sharply 
depreciated real exchange rate and little 
contribution of stable long-term capital flows to 
the financing of the current-account deficits in 
the rest of the area. Total factor productivity 
growth has been stagnant throughout the area 
and there has been little market opening beyond 
manufacturing, the domain of the German 
competitive advantage. The services markets 
have remained closed, especially for the very 
important network utility services (energy, 
transport and communications), which are still 
organised on a national basis under tight national 
protection (and often public ownership of service 
providers). This market segmentation and 
persistent protection of national oligopolistic 
structures in network services and network 
utilities has been consistently identified as a main 
factor in explaining the sizeable delays in the 
adoption of IT technologies and the productivity 
shortfalls in the eurozone and the European 
Union relative to the United States (Timmer et al., 
2010). 
[2] percent of GDP or, according to their estimates, to about 
4.5% on average over the NIIP.    
10 Conference Board data on total factor productivity are 
only available starting in 1990. For this reason, the 
comparison of productivity in the lower quadrant of Figure 
4 is based on labour productivity – which amplifies the 
relative gains of US partners, owing to stronger labour 
substitution in the presence of more rapid labour cost 
increases relative to the United States.      
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Figure 4. Real effective exchange rates, net exports and labour productivity under Bretton Woods and in 
the eurozone 
 
* Main partners are France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.  
Source: Eurostat for Germany, relative to the rest of EZ. Bordo (1993) and US Bureau of Labor Statistics for the United 
States, computed as the average of main partners’ bilateral real exchange rates ULC adjusted.  
 
Source: Ameco. Constant prices. 
 
*Main partners are Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Conference Board. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The evidence discussed in this note raises some 
questions relevant for the long-term 
sustainability of the eurozone. The system seems 
unable to generate sufficient growth and 
inflation to place excessive public debt on a 
credible reduction path. It does not seem to have 
a functioning adjustment mechanism to reabsorb 
existing competitive imbalances; their correction 
solely through domestic deflation policies in 
deficit/debtor countries would worsen an 
already dismal growth performance and possibly 
soon hit a hard wall of political and social 
resistance. Under these trends, one cannot 
exclude that at some stage a new financial shock 
may hit a highly indebted country – possibly 
when the ECB’s bond-buying programme will 
come close to its end – while discussions on an 
effective risk-sharing mechanism remain stalled 
in a climate of deep mutual mistrust.  
The eurozone is not condemned to this 
doomsday scenario and could be lifted from this 
unsustainable path by appropriate policies, but 
these would require choices that its members 
seem at present unwilling to make.  
On the one hand, it is imperative to raise the 
growth path of the eurozone economy, and the 
ECB expansionary policies may not suffice to this 
end. There is an urgent need to raise public and 
private investment in Germany and elsewhere, to 
improve material and immaterial infrastructures 
where the European economy has been falling 
behind (IMF, 2014). The ultra-low level of long-
term interest rates offers ample opportunity to 
borrow and invest long-term at attractive returns. 
The Juncker plan (European Commission 2015b) 
may be of help in this regard. However, a 
significant increase in private investment will not 
be forthcoming without a major market-opening 
initiative by the European Council and the 
Commission – which brings me to the second 
horn of a strategy to rescue the eurozone from its 
eventual demise. 
The eurozone (and the European Union) needs 
aggressive market opening in services, which is 
the area where it has been systematically lagging 
behind the United States in GDP and 
productivity growth, and which holds the 
promise of generating significant income and 
jobs. There is an especially urgent need to open 
Europe’s network utility services to competition 
and cross-border integration, which would 
attract substantial private investment from all 
over the world for the consolidation of the 
fragmented and inefficient energy, transport and 
communications industries in the area. Over the 
longer period, the eurozone should aim to 
achieve a full integration of labour and capital 
markets, which is the only way to finally 
eradicate market segmentation and competitive 
imbalances from its economy. 
All of this is predicated, of course, on the 
hypothesis that budgetary and structural reform 
policies in the eurozone member countries will be 
kept on a course of improving convergence in 
fundamentals.  
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